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Susan Mancino 
Saint Mary’s College 
John Arthos offers the most clear and direct application of philosophical hermeneutics for 
the field of communication. While much of Arthos’s work details and expands Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s contribution to the hermeneutic and rhetorical traditions, most recently, in Hermeneutics 
After Ricœur, Arthos offers a critical appropriation of Ricœur’s project for general hermeneutics. By 
bringing Ricœur into dialogue and contestation, the book enacts general hermeneutics in its form 
and method. Blending together theory and application, Arthos provides a textured review of 
Ricœur’s work, accounting for its intersections with his life experience and his contemporaries. 
Arthos begins with a point of application, framing general hermeneutics in higher 
education. Drawing upon his experience incorporating this approach into a liberal arts program at 
Indiana University, Arthos frames general hermeneutics as “an ally against the proclivity of the 
university to become an uncritical adjunct to an unthinking corporate culture” (1). He references 
Gadamer’s educational philosophy rooted in “vulnerability-recognition-transformation” while 
simultaneously recognizing Gadamer’s “chief weakness”—an exaggerated emphasis on belonging 
(1-2). Ultimately, Arthos seeks to integrate Gadamer’s dialogic consciousness with Ricœur’s 
hermeneutics. 
Arthos reviews hermeneutics’ humanistic impulses, tracing the relationship between 
hermeneutics and rhetoric from Friedrich Schleiermacher’s work onward. While Heidegger and 
Gadamer rely on Schleiermacher and Dilthey, who used hermeneutics to oppose positivism, 
Ricœur reverted to a “critical-methodological school” while maintaining a commitment to 
ontology (4). This shift complicates his trajectory, rooted primarily in French rather than German 
philosophical traditions. The intellectual culture of France during and after World War II creates a 
“distinct heritage” from German hermeneutics; this influence, or in Arthos’s words, “intervention,” 
alters the “character and sense of direction” for hermeneutics more broadly (9). Ricœur’s 
hermeneutics, which cannot be equated with his philosophy, marks a distinctive turn from the 
German hermeneutic tradition dating back to the Reformation. 
In Chapter 1, Arthos juxtaposes seven distinctions between Gadamer and Ricœur that 
were first noted by Jean Grondin. The first distinguishes their fundamental question; Ricœur 
emphasizes interpretation while Gadamer highlights understanding. The second distinction 
identifies their intellectual adversaries; while Ricœur counters the assumption that language is “a 
tool of deception,” Gadamer confronts the Enlightenment emphasis on reason (12). The third 
difference surfaces in their responses to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology; unlike Gadamer’s 
linguistic turn, Ricœur contends that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology “short-circuited the 
passage of hermeneutic identity through linguistic culture” (13). The fourth distinction juxtaposes 
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difference considers agency. Gadamer’s emphasis on tradition highlights autonomy, while 
Ricœur’s emphasis on capability and fallibility points toward the self’s limitations. The sixth 
distinction accounts for personal agency and ethics, recognizing Ricœur’s turn to Aristotle and 
Kant as a response to a lack of ethical consideration in German hermeneutics. The final difference 
appears within the role of language; while meaning manifests through language in Gadamer’s 
work, Ricœur contends that the capability of the self is a result of language. 
From these seven distinctions, Arthos focuses on two: the movements confronted by each 
thinker and their explication of agency. From these two differences, Arthos searches for phronesis. 
In response to Ricœur, Arthos problematizes the privileged realm of the expert and reiterates the 
recognition that history, memory, and historians are always situated and interpreted within larger 
social, political, and cultural contexts. In response to Gadamer, Arthos references Dennis Schmidt’s 
position that the Gadamerian project only works “where status and security are secured,” but once 
removed from those privileges, his phronesis becomes “inadequate” (19). Arthos explains that while 
neither project takes us to this communication climate, Ricœur considers ethics and justice 
implications. Arthos explores these possibilities and simultaneously outlines some concerns, 
beginning with hermeneutics’ relationship to structuralism. 
This concern becomes the guiding theme of Chapter 2. Arthos traces Ricœur’s commitment 
to Algirdas Julien Greimas. While Greimas sought an algorithmic and algebraic understanding of 
narrative, Ricœur aimed “to save structuralism from itself” (28). In his 1984 essay, “On 
Narrativity,” Ricœur proposes a “hermeneutic correction” to Greimas’s structuralism (42). While 
Ricœur positioned structuralism’s emphasis on scientific explanation “a worthy counterweight” to 
understanding in hermeneutics, Arthos finds this attachment methodologically unsound as it 
denies hermeneutics’ attentiveness to the particularity of a text (42). Arthos offers the structuralist 
project articulated by Gerard Genette as a potential alternative. While Ricœur was only ever critical 
of Genette’s project, Arthos contends that these critiques are better directed toward Greimas and 
suggests that Ricœur missed Genette’s meaningful amendments to structuralism, which could 
have contributed to Ricœur’s attempt to integrate explanation and understanding. 
In Chapter 3, Arthos discusses the “mixed success” of Ricœur’s “structural-hermeneutic 
method” (51). Ricœur hoped to offer a new paradigm for the human sciences that could bridge 
objective analysis and interpretive judgment by applying textual analysis to human action. Ricœur 
suggests that textual analysis is a valid method for the human sciences. Within this argument, 
Ricœur assumes that the logic of an argument can account for an action’s meaning. Arthos objects 
to Ricœur’s conflation between actions and their records as well as his contention that human 
actions are more akin to written texts than ephemeral speech. Arthos extends Ricœur’s textual 
analysis of human action with Johann Michel’s hermeneutic sociology and Louis Quéré’s 
hermeneutic anthropology. These accounts foreground of the problematic implications of 
privileging the hermeneutic insights of experts. 
Arthos problematizes Ricœur’s emphasis on the expert in Chapter 4. This emphasis moves 
away from Gadamer’s stress on dialogue and announces significant “class implications” (74). 
Arthos recognizes the social responsibility placed upon disciplinary and professional experts but 
objects to the notion that hermeneutic understanding falls within this category. After a 1982 
exchange with Gadamer on this theme, Ricœur introduces discussions on the “enlightened citizen” 
as a “court of public opinion” (91-2). Arthos, however, determines that these additions do not 
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indicate an amendment. Viewing these additions as too “weak” and “passive,” Arthos prefers the 
“nuanced collaboration” required of Gadamerian dialogue, which is better characterized as a 
“clash” rather than an “agreement” (92). Arthos advocates for the “anticipatory skills” that inform 
interpreters about when the expertise of another is necessary. In this engagement, the practical use 
of hermeneutics emerges with a dual recognition of Ricœur’s appreciation for institutions and 
Gadamer’s commitment to dialogue. 
To respond to this need, Chapter 5 amends Ricœur’s narrative hermeneutics. Arthos 
problematizes Ricœur’s emphasis on textual inscription, arguing that the notions of configuration, 
prefiguration, and refiguration should apply more broadly to narrative identity rather than solely 
to literary texts. Within Ricœur’s account for temporality, Arthos suggests a turn from the text to 
the notion of ipse. Arthos suggests that “narrative identity is not an ‘offshoot’ of the operations of 
narrative configuration, but rather the very thing itself” (111). Arthos’s amendment to Ricœur’s 
narrative hermeneutics advocates for multi-modal narrative identity that does not view a text as a 
fully closed end. 
In Chapter 6, Arthos follows Ricœur’s response to others while constructing his distinctive 
detour. Beginning with his mentor, Jean Nabert, Ricœur responds to “a proto-hermeneutic 
impulse,” seeking to place the self within a “complex negotiation” (117-8); however, Ricœur 
determined this negotiation as incomplete within Nabert’s work and tasked himself with 
completing this project. In response to Husserl, Ricœur situates phenomenology within the 
hermeneutic tradition (119). Arthos places Ricœur’s “hermeneutic (re)turn” in the 1960s, 
emphasizing his notion of the symbol. In the psychoanalytic model provided by Freud, Ricœur 
finds hermeneutic possibilities situated within the tensions of ontology and psycholinguistic 
philosophy, the conscious and unconscious, the methodological framing of psychoanalyst and 
interpreter, and the understanding of meaning within as an inner/outer relation. This influence 
moves away from Heidegger’s conceptualization of hermeneutics as a “mode of understanding of 
Dasein” (126). Ultimately, Ricœur’s detour demonstrates that hermeneutics is never a complete 
circle, even when he suggested that we speak of a spiral. This step away from Heidegger directs 
Ricœur toward human finitude and fallibility in the constitution of the self. Ricœur’s notion of self 
is constituted discursively, narratively, and socially in contexts reciprocally influenced by 
institutions. This stress on institutions recognizes cultural ground and announces ongoing 
responsibility. 
Arthos commits Chapter 7 to Ricœur’s work on the promise of institutions as a mediating 
link between the personal and the political. Arthos clarifies Ricœur’s framing of the promise as a 
bridge between “personal identity and social responsibility” (143). Promises, through language, 
permit us to consider the perspective of another, to establish temporal structures, and to build 
character. For Ricœur, institutions “carry over human commitments to broader and more 
permanent social forms” (145). Arthos identifies how institutions embrace the changing present 
and enduring textual inscriptions. Institutional policies and standards inform Ricœur’s reliance on 
Kant’s commitment to rules. Institutions, like promises, are performative, expressing intention and 
identity. Arthos extends this discussion with jurisprudence, punishment, forgiveness, critical 
philosophy, and politics. 
In Chapter 8, Arthos reviews Ricœur’s reliance on Kant’s moral philosophy. In Ricœur, one 
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Kantian qualification” allows practical reason to test institutional rules as one moves toward the 
particularities of application (162). Kant’s categorical imperative measures institutional standards 
by mediating self interest and responsibility for the other. Ricœur positions language as a 
“necessary condition for evil” (172) that opens possibilities for action and deception. Through 
language, Ricœur positions hermeneutics toward ethical obligations. Arthos announces 
implications for a hermeneutics of suspicion and general hermeneutics. 
In Chapter 9, Arthos traces notions of the ethical and the political in Ricœur’s life 
experiences and philosophical perspective. In his earliest works, as Europe faced the economic 
depression and political turbulence that led to World War II, Ricœur condemned capitalism and 
consumerism. He collaborated with Emmanuel Mounier on Espirit to interrupt “the dehumanizing 
machinery of mass society” (185). By the 1950s, Ricœur’s early radicalism shifted toward “a critical 
analysis of political power in established systems” (186). Following widespread attacks on the 
legitimacy of authority, Ricœur accepted the deanship at the University of Nanterre in 1969. Ricœur 
hoped to mediate a radical progressive orientation with a commitment to “just institutions.” (189) 
Ricœur made himself available to students for open discussion. Arthos suggests that this 
availability made him vulnerable to having students empty a garbage can over his head in the 
university’s cafeteria. This event gained public traction, rallying sympathy and ridicule. Afterward, 
Ricœur resigned as dean. 
According to Arthos, Ricœur’s reputation experienced a “triple assault” (194); this incident 
at Nanterre paired with strong critiques of his work on Freud and a “very public loss” of a position 
at the Collège de France to Michel Foucault caused Ricœur to step back from the French intellectual 
scene (194). Ricœur began teaching at the University of Chicago where he remained an active 
researcher. Following the Chicago lectures, Ricœur “retreated” from their themes, prompting 
Arthos to describe Ricœur’s later work as “backward-looking” (200). Arthos explains that 
hermeneutics after Ricœur continues to address the ethical and political legitimacy of institutions. 
Arthos summarizes the implications of Ricœur’s work for general hermeneutics. Centered 
on the dialectical themes of Ricœur’s project, Arthos recounts his concern in 
explanation/understanding, text/speech, expert/layperson, method/judgment, and 
freedom/punishment. Nonetheless, Arthos celebrates Ricœur’s attentiveness to the ethical and 
political implications of hermeneutics and his recognition of critical theory. 
Arthos appropriates Ricœur’s project for the ongoing enactment of general hermeneutics. 
He positions general hermeneutics within the current environment of higher education. This 
discussion is one of the most valuable contributions of Hermeneutics After Ricœur. In an era 
characterized by the collegiate embrace of a corporate mindset, Arthos offers Ricœur and general 
hermeneutics as a defense for education rather than certification, for critical thinking rather than 
technique, and for understanding rather than consumerism. It would have been helpful to read 
more about the program he implemented at Indiana University particularly in the book’s 
conclusion. Nonetheless, Arthos’s engagement with Ricœur demonstrates general hermeneutics in 
action. Consistent with modes of hermeneutic engagement, Arthos moves from question to text to 
understanding to implications for ongoing inquiry. Arthos enacts his unique ability to practice 
general hermeneutics as he explains its theoretical and practical implications. 
